Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment & India-Middle East-Europe Economics Corridor event during the G20 Summit in New Delhi on September 09, 2023. Photo by the Indian Prime Minister’s Office on Wikimedia Commons. Government Open Data License

The Zangezur Corridor has become a prominent topic on the news agenda recently. Corridor projects, including the Zangezur route through Armenia’s Syunik province linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, are reshaping trade and energy flows in West Asia. These shifts highlight the central role of energy and security in the region’s political landscape. Its 43-kilometer (27-mile) route runs through Armenian territory, effectively linking Azerbaijan — and behind it Central Asia, China, and India — to Europe via Turkey. Donald Trump’s so-called peace show at the White House between Armenia and Azerbaijan has only heightened the sensitivity of this matter.

The crucial point, however, is that Iran derives no benefit from this corridor. Furthermore, the United States is establishing its direct presence in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea for the first time. In this situation, Iran, which has effectively been excluded from all major corridors, now finds itself facing the West, and even Israel, at its doorstep. The question remains: can one stop at these corridors alone, or is there a larger plan designed to push Iran out of global equations gradually?

The IMEC Corridor

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced in 2023, links India to Europe via the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, offering an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Designed to connect India to West Asia and Europe, the IMEC is being developed with the participation of Gulf states and will directly link India to Israel. Its implementation is expected to reduce transportation expenses by around 40 percent. In this context, Saudi Arabia has made massive investments in its rail network and plans to expand its railway capacity severalfold by 2030. This scheme completely excludes Iran.

India, a commercial rival to China in Iran, has so far done little despite its large-scale agreements with Tehran over the Chabahar Port — which was intended to rival Pakistan’s Gwadar Port — and has even acted to block Chinese investments. India’s involvement in the North-South Corridor, which passes through Iran, has also been limited; because of weak infrastructure, it refrained from investing and even routed its wheat aid to Afghanistan through Pakistan and China rather than via Iran. India made no such investment in the corridor, unlike Russia and Azerbaijan, which invested along parts of their shared border.

At the same time, India is a strategic partner of Israel, advancing numerous military and economic projects, including investment in the Port of Haifa under the Adani Group and participation in the Barak project. In the South Caucasus, India has invested in Yerevan, contrasting with Azerbaijan’s close partnership with Tel Aviv and shaping its regional policy not in alliance with Israel but in rivalry with China. Nevertheless, Israel’s influence has prevented the conclusion of major agreements between India and Armenia.

Parallel to these complex relations, India has expanded its military footprint in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. While India did not support Western sanctions against Russia, this was more a matter of energy competition with China than alignment with Moscow. In the Caucasus, however, New Delhi, through a quiet division of labor with Israel, is gradually expanding its strategic presence. Today, India is Armenia’s largest supplier of defense equipment. Major contracts with Yerevan and investments by firms such as Kalyani Strategic Systems and Zen Technologies reflect this trend.

India’s creeping efforts to expand influence in Iraq are also noteworthy: it has become the second-largest buyer of Iraqi oil. This move is tied to both the Al-Faw Port project and its connection to Turkey, as well as to securing IMEC’s stability, since possible upheavals in Iraq and Syria could jeopardize the corridor. This, in turn, has alarmed Pakistan, pushing Islamabad to strengthen ties with Baghdad, an opening that inevitably draws Israel into the competition.

Meanwhile, China itself has refrained from investing in the Iran route of its Belt and Road Initiative. Unlike Pakistan, Beijing does not currently view Tehran as an alternative for its corridors, a stance also reflected in the passive nature of the so-called 25-year strategic agreement between Iran and China.

The Ben-Gurion Corridor

The Ben-Gurion Canal is about 50 percent longer than the Suez Canal, yet it offers advantages that may encourage regional states to use it. Unlike the Suez Canal, which is sandy and earthen and poses numerous challenges for shipping, the proposed route of the Ben-Gurion Canal is rocky and solid, eliminating such problems.

Another advantage is its two-way design, allowing ships to simultaneously travel in both directions. In contrast, the Suez Canal, because of its narrow width, can only accommodate one-way traffic, forcing authorities to schedule separate days for inbound and outbound shipping.

According to Israeli estimates, construction of the Ben-Gurion Canal would take around five years and require a minimum investment of USD 55 billion. To finance the project, Israel has reached agreements with three US American banks for a loan of billions at just one percent interest, with a 30-year repayment period.

Northern Gaza is the planned location for the canal’s connection to the Mediterranean. Israel sees the complete removal of Gaza’s population and their resettlement in Egypt as the primary solution for safeguarding the canal.

Together with the IMEC corridor, which terminates in Haifa, the Ben-Gurion Canal would significantly strengthen Israel’s economic and energy position. Weakening Egypt and turning Haifa into a major hub for energy and trade are among the key objectives of this strategy, one pursued by India in West Asia and by Israel in the Mediterranean and Levant.

The Lapis Lazuli and Zangezur Corridors

India’s pursuit of influence in Central Asia revolves around the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, a project that began in 2012 and is currently in the process of implementation. This corridor effectively sidelines Pakistan from Afghanistan’s trade routes and reduces China’s leverage. Although it does not yet have a direct connection to India, escalating tensions between Pakistan and India, along with developments in Kashmir, could eventually make it a viable alternative route linking India to Europe via Afghanistan, bypassing Iran altogether. The corridor connects to the Trans-Caspian route, once again excluding Iran from regional trade flows.

Israel is also an active player in this process. This strategy includes major investments in Central Asia, particularly from arms manufacturers like Elbit Systems, as well as the involvement of the MASHAV development agency. Even the European Union has recently engaged with Turkic states of Central Asia to reduce dependence on Russia and China. Given that 22 percent of Israel’s energy imports come from these countries, this trend is of vital importance to Tel Aviv.

With regard to Zangezur, Iran’s ideological approach has turned the corridor — despite lying in the territory of Armenia, Tehran’s tactical ally — into a tool of pressure against it. Iran failed to capitalize on its cultural and linguistic assets to strengthen its influence in Azerbaijan, and its confrontational stance toward Baku drove the latter closer to Tel Aviv. Backed by the United States and Israel, the Zangezur Corridor not only excludes Iran from regional economic exchanges but also reduces Armenia’s dependence on Tehran, weakens Russia’s foothold in the Caucasus, and secures Israel’s energy and trade interests.

Although some argue that this corridor is geographically distant from Israel, its linkage to Turkey, and potentially in the future to Syria or Lebanon, would once again enable Tel Aviv to leverage energy and trade dependencies as a means of consolidating influence over its regional partners.

Corridor projects, population displacements, and regional alliances have reshaped control over trade and energy routes. Instability in these areas risks economic disruption for regional actors. Meanwhile, shifts in influence across Iraq, Syria, and the broader region highlight the growing role of energy and security in shaping West Asia’s political landscape. Iran faces mounting challenges within these dynamics.