Image by Global Voices on Canva Pro
This story is part of Undertones, Global Voices’ Civic Media Observatory‘s newsletter. Subscribe to Undertones.
In early December 2024, the brutal dynastic Assad regime that had ruled Syria since 1963 collapsed in the space of two weeks under a concerted offensive by disparate opposition forces coordinated by the Sunni Islamist militia group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa.
We analyzed two narratives circulating among Syrians on X, searching for reactions to the major milestones as members of Syrian civil society monitored the establishment of the post-Assad state. Both narratives are prominent examples of how the community expresses its priorities and wishes for the country, and how it expects the political scenario to evolve in the near future.
But first, let's rewind a little. On January 29, 2025, the Syrian Revolution Victory Conference, organized by HTS at the Presidential Palace and attended by the leaders of the armed revolutionary factions that collaborated to topple the Assad regime, announced the appointment of al-Sharaa as transitional president, abolishing the constitution, parliament, military, and security services of the Assad regime. The conference was widely criticized for excluding vast segments of the opposition, such as the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and other civil society groups and figures.
In the 20 years since he was imprisoned by US forces in Iraq, Ahmed al-Sharaa, under the nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Julani, steered salafi jihadism towards Syria to fight the Assad regime, collaborated with and fought against the Islamic State (IS), pledged allegiance to and broke away from Al Qaeda, and, in a series of masterful and ruthless military campaigns, eliminated or coopted his Islamist opponents, eroded non-jihadist revolutionary forces and grappled with popular discontent, to erect a technocratic proto-state in northwestern Syria’s Idlib province. The non-democratic Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) developed the region to some extent and afforded its inhabitants some liberties, but effectively remained authoritarian, with al-Sharaa's style of governance described as “personalistic and dictatorial,” and widely documented human rights abuses attributed to HTS.
In early March, following coordinated armed attacks by Assad regime remnants against military and security forces in the Latakia and Tartous governorates, sectarian revenge killings involving militias affiliated with the al-Sharaa government targeted the Alawite minority. The ensuing atrocities, reportedly including filmed humiliation, killings of hundreds of civilians, and kidnappings on a large scale, were met with protests and international condemnation. President al-Sharaa established a fact-finding committee to investigate the massacre, calling the attacks a threat on Syrian unity. However, as of yet, the fact-finding committee has not published its findings, and no individuals have been held publicly accountable.
Rather, certain leaders involved in the massacres have been promoted within the country's security apparatus. The most prominent example is Brigadier General Mohammed al-Jassem, also known as Abu Amsha. Formerly the commander of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, a faction within the Turkish-supported Syrian National Army, al-Jassem, who was implicated in the atrocities committed during the massacres, was appointed commander of the 25th Division.
On March 14, President al-Sharaa signed an interim constitution, establishing legislation for a five-year transitional period with jurisprudence based on Islamic law, to be presided over by al-Sharaa himself. Human Rights Watch cautioned that the constitutional declaration “grants the president significant authority, including over judicial and legislative appointments without any checks or oversight.”
Narrative: President al-Sharaa is an authoritarian in disguise
Since the interim constitution was signed, more questions have arisen over al-Sharaa's political goals. In mid-May 2025, in assessing his pledge at the Victory Conference that new state institutions would be founded on transparency and accountability, London-based journal Syria in Transition asserted that “authoritarian mechanisms based on loyalty and patronage appear not as temporary necessities, but deliberate tools of power.” The journal noted that the appointment of the president's brothers in positions controlling access and decision-making is reminiscent of the Assad regime's entrenched nepotism. In mid-January, the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre questioned al-Sharaa's commitment to accountability after the appointment of draconian Islamist Idlib judge Shadi Al-Waisi as minister of justice. Al-Waisi was replaced in the post on March 30, but al-Sharaa continued appointing leaders of factions responsible for international crimes to high-level military positions.
On May 19, Human Rights Watch noted that the Transitional Justice Commission established by the constitutional declaration “is troublingly narrow and excludes many victims,” despite being “tasked with adopting victim-centred mechanisms.”
How this narrative is shared online
Mazen Hassoun is a Syrian journalist from Raqqa and the co-founder of the online outlet Al-Raqqa Post. He resides in Germany, where he arrived in 2015 as a refugee, after the fall of Raqqa to the Islamic State, and received asylum. His reports on Syria during the civil war were published by Al Jazeera, Global Voices, and other outlets.
In this X item, embedding an Al Arabiya TV segment on the signing of the constitutional declaration, Hassoun notes with alarm the markers pointing to an increased concentration of power on the person of President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Several comments to the embedded item call the Constitutional Declaration “sharia law,” with varying other reactions.
This item garnered a civic impact score of +2, as it is indicative of revolutionary civil society's commitment to helping bring about a democratic and peaceful Syria based on justice and accountability.
Narrative: We are hopeful and want to believe that President al-Sharaa can bring the change we need for Syria
This narrative carries the largely implicit belief that, due to his diplomatic prowess, political cunning, unique historical positioning to bridge the gap between the disparate forces vying over Syria, and the myriad challenges threatening Syria's recovery without other forces presenting themselves as potential solutions, President Ahmed al-Sharaa is the only possible leader who can deliver a peaceful and prosperous future for the country.
In less than six months after toppling the Assad regime, al-Sharaa has been mounting a campaign of diplomatic charm, both domestically and internationally, to build support for his vision of that future, meeting with international leaders and diplomats to secure sanctions relief and cooperation, and attempting to appease political, religious and military factions domestically. The effort culminated in the lifting of all or most economic sanctions on Syria by the United States, the European Union and several Western countries by mid-May.
How this narrative is shared online
In this X item, posted 10 days after the fall of the Assad regime, journalist Ahmad Houthaifa expresses that despite the uncertainty and fear surrounding the prospect of former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharra ruling the country, indications that he belongs to Damascus and treasures the connections with its people provide a measure of hope for the country's future.
The item garnered a civic impact score of +1. Although al-Sharaa's visits to his childhood places were part of his “charm offensive” on the national front, they seem to have genuinely inspired some measure of hope for the country's future. At the same time, the cult of personality apparently congealing around a controversial leader during a challenging time for the country could undermine Syria's democratic prospects.
