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The most recent reported non-combat death of a serviceman in Azerbaijan's military occurred on May 26, when soldier Fariz Isayev allegedly succumbed to sudden shock after receiving an antibiotic injection for a high fever. While the local military prosecutor has opened a criminal case, the history of non-combat deaths among conscripts in the Azerbaijani army raises concerns that, due to a persistent lack of transparency, accountability, and meaningful reforms, Isayev's sudden death may well be overlooked, much like similar fatalities in the past.

Numbers that are hard to find

Several organizations track non-combat deaths in the Azerbaijani army, with the Caspian Defense Studies Institute (CDSI) providing the most consistent reporting. According to CDSI's documentation, there were a total of 957 non-combat casualties between 2003 and 2025, including 14 casualties documented so far this year. The CDSI compiles its data by monitoring social media posts, local news, and any relevant information released by the Ministry of Defense, Azerbaijani Armed Forces, and other pertinent state institutions.

In 2013, the death of 18-year-old conscript Jeyhun Gubadov, initially dismissed as a heart attack but later revealed to show signs of violence, ignited significant public anger and protests in Baku. The outcry led the Ministry of Defense to execute arrest warrants for two soldiers, reprimand the general in command, demote the base commander, and sack the deputy commander, signifying an official acknowledgment of the issue by the Ministry.

However, the arrests also extended to participants and organizers of the protests. Seven members of N!DA (an exclamation mark in Azerbaijani), a youth activist group, were subsequently sentenced to lengthy jail terms on charges widely regarded as bogus.

Meanwhile, non-combat deaths and reports of corruption in the army continued, leaving many with the perception that the initial government response was a largely cosmetic, temporary measure aimed at placating dissatisfied citizens.

At the time of writing, neither the Ministry of Defense nor the Azerbaijani Armed Forces has shared comprehensive data on non-combat deaths, nor is there any publicly available information on launched or even finalized investigations against individuals who may have committed crimes that led to the deaths of conscripts. This lack of official data occurs in the the context of the Azerbaijani government and defense ministry's consistent reluctance to publicly discuss non-combat related fatalities.

Why is this an issue?

Azerbaijan has been steadily increasing its military spending. In 2024, the allocated budget for defense and national security amounted to USD 3.7 billion (AZN 6,421,047,420). This year, it was raised to USD 4.9 billion (AZN 8,396,297,596). For comparison, the 2022 budget totaled USD 2.6 billion (AZN 4,489,892,429).

Military service is compulsory in Azerbaijan, with a duration of a year and a half, though university diploma holders complete their service within one year. Despite the substantial allocated budget, the army environment has not appeared to improve, given the persistence of issues relating to non-combat deaths.

One of the most enduring problems is “dedovshchina” – hazing or mistreatment. Physical violence, psychological abuse, and humiliation of new draftees remain common practices, a deep-seated legacy from the Soviet era. Suicide is another significant cause, often linked to the psychological stress and abuse, with experts noting a pronounced lack of psychosocial support. Other frequently reported causes of non-combat deaths include car and airplane accidents, falls, drowning, illness, violation of safety rules, and incidents during military service.

Experts contend that many of these deaths could be avoided were it not for the scale of corruption within the military. This endemic graft, they argue, has paralyzed fundamental aspects such as training and maintenance of military equipment, including weapons. It has also fostered nepotism and informal hierarchies that undermine discipline and trust; led to officers demanding bribes for leave, better living conditions, or to avoid abuse; and facilitated systemic corruption in the mobilization and conscription processes, all of which result in unfit individuals being forcibly drafted, while others avoid service through falsified documents.

According to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, Azerbaijan ranked 154th out of 180 countries in 2024, highlighting the severity of the issue.

In April 2022, the president of Azerbaijan confirmed the “National Action Plan on Strengthening the Fight against Corruption for 2022-2026.” It was announced just months after the State Security Service (SSS) launched an operation at the Ministry of Defense, resulting in the arrest of approximately 15 officials on charges of embezzlement and other criminal offenses.

Senior officials at the ministry, including Major General Nizami Mammadov, former head of the Finance and Budget Department; Malikmammad Gurbanov, who headed the Procurement and Supply Department; and Fikrat Mirzayev, the former head of the Housing and Utilities Department, were accused of embezzling some USD 84 million (AZN 143 million).

However, the plan and the arrests were not enough to tackle endemic corruption. In an interview with Radio Liberty's Azerbaijan Service, Bashir Suleymanli, who until recently was the director of the independent non-governmental organization Civil Rights Institute, stated that the plan was ineffective for eradicating “large-scale corruption.” He added that there was no oversight over “the implementation of documents adopted” due to the “absence of independent media and civil society,” stressing that both were necessary for a serious impact.

Three years after that interview, in March 2025, Suleymanli was himself arrested and placed in pre-trial detention for three months and 28 days. One of many civil society activists, journalists, and rights defenders who were attempting to hold the ruling government to account until their efforts were curtailed, he is being accused of money laundering and abuse of power. Since November 2023, scores of Azerbaijan's civil society have been placed behind bars on trumped up charges.

The post-war reality

Following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, while the government publicly championed its veterans and martyrs, support on the ground was frequently criticized as inadequate and marred by systemic issues. Despite official claims of extensive social support packages, including housing, financial aid, and rehabilitation services for over 100,000 people, many veterans have reported struggling to access these benefits.

Numerous reports highlight a mental health crisis among veterans, with dozens taking their own lives since 2020, as they struggle with unaddressed trauma and socio-economic difficulties. Protests have occurred outside government ministries, as veterans demand promised disability benefits, as well as pensions that they claim are either being revoked or made inaccessible thanks to tightened assessment criteria and bureaucratic hurdles. Advocates for war veterans’ rights are being disciplined as well. War veteran Haci Valiyev, once the chair of “Young Veterans” Public Union – which as of May 28 announced it was disbanding itself – was arrested and sentenced to pretrial detention in April 2025.

Independent social workers have also criticized rehabilitation programs as superficial, underfunded, and failing to provide holistic care for the complex psychological and physical traumas of war, suggesting a significant disconnect between official rhetoric and the lived experiences of those who served.

In a 2022 piece published by the Baku Research Institute, an independent think tank in Azerbaijan, independent economist Farid Mehralizadeh pointed out the inequality in insurance payments and benefits assigned to servicemen compared to members of the Azerbaijani parliament. He was arrested in May 2024 and, like Suleymanli, is among scores of rights defenders, academics, and researchers currently behind bars.

Adding to this complex picture is the sometimes contradictory treatment of martyrs and their families. In Azerbaijani society, martyrs (Şəhidlər) are deeply revered, their sacrifice seen as foundational to national identity and territorial integrity. Public spaces often feature their images, and their families are theoretically afforded the highest respect and state support.

Yet, this respect can sometimes be selective or even superficial. For instance, a recent video being circulated showed images of martyrs being removed from public display in the city of Ganja. While official explanations for such removals are often tied to urban reconstruction, event hosting, or re-framing memorial sites, these incidents cause significant pain and outrage among the families and the public, who perceive them as dismissive of the sacrifices made.

The lack of accountability and other systemic issues have a profound impact on the families of deceased soldiers. Beyond the immense grief, many families struggle to receive accurate information about their loved one's death, as they wrestle with official narratives that contradict their own observations and suspicions of foul play.

Families of soldiers killed in the Karabakh War, for instance, whether in combat or non-combat situations, have reported difficulties in receiving promised state compensation, adding financial strain to their emotional distress. There is a palpable lack of official psychological or social support mechanisms for these families, who are often left to cope with their loss and seek justice independently.