Fireball billowing from Shahid Rajaee port, April 26, 2025. Picture by Meysam Mirzadeh / Tasnim News Agency. CC BY 4.0

By Reza Talebi

On April 25, 2025 (6 Ordibehesht 1404 in the Iranian calendar), a massive explosion rocked Shahid Rajaee Port in Bandar Abbas — the largest port in Iran and the second busiest in West Asia. The blast killed 70 people and injured 1,240 others, shattering windows in a three to five kilometer radius. Authorities attributed the explosion to the presence of hazardous materials. 

Reports indicated that between 1,000 and 2,000 tons of sodium perchlorate had been transported from China to the port by the ships Jeyran and Golban. Western sources claimed that this amount of sodium perchlorate could be used to produce 960 tons of ammonium perchlorate, which in turn could fuel 1,300 tons of missile propellant — enough to launch 260 medium-range missiles. 

Experts estimated the explosive power of the blast to be between 200 and 800 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT). If we take the higher estimate — 800 tons of TNT — the energy released would be approximately 3,347,000 megajoules. Each kilogram of TNT produces about 4.184 megajoules of energy. To generate the same amount of energy, one would need about 1,240 tons of ammonium nitrate or 1,115 tons of sodium perchlorate. 

These figures show that sodium perchlorate, commonly used in solid rocket fuel, has an energy density closer to TNT. Improper storage of such a material can lead to catastrophic consequences, as witnessed in Bandar Abbas.

Similarities and unanswered questions

This explosion recalls the Beirut port disaster of 2020, which involved 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate and resulted in more than 220 deaths, as well as the Nishapur train explosion in 2004, which had a blast equivalent to 180 tons of TNT and claimed 352 lives. Both tragedies stemmed from negligence in managing hazardous materials. 

In the case of Bandar Abbas, the sodium perchlorate had been stored in a civilian dock without a manifest or declaration, rather than in a military facility belonging to the IRGC or the Ministry of Defense. The explosion occurred on the very day of Iran’s nuclear negotiations, at a port that handles half of Iran’s trade volume. 

Questions about the explosion remain unanswered. If such a quantity of sodium perchlorate was stored there, why was the blast less intense than expected? Had part of the material been relocated beforehand? Iranian officials confirmed negligence, but the companies involved — Sina, affiliated with the Foundation of the Oppressed, and Keyhan Sharyan Zarrin, responsible for port security — became the focus of public criticism. One manager from these companies, in an interview with ILNA, called the materials “ordinary,” but the statement was quickly deleted.

Security crisis and speculations of sabotage

The explosion laid bare Iran’s security vulnerabilities. Back in 2020, Israel had launched a cyberattack on Shahid Rajaee Port, disrupting its operations. Now, some speculated that the 2025 blast was another act of sabotage — possibly by Israel. Statements from Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu regarding covert “pager” operations allegedly targeting Iranian sites have fueled these suspicions. Some have even linked the recent helicopter crash involving President Ebrahim Raisi to such operations, though Raisi’s helicopter was a different model from those used in Lebanon and there is no concrete evidence. 

If sabotage is confirmed, it suggests a dangerous level of foreign infiltration into Iran’s military infrastructure, including missile bases. Five months earlier, Abdol Hossein Khosropanah — the head of Iran’s Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution — had publicly warned that Shahid Rajaee Port lacked proper X-ray scanning equipment, a serious oversight for a strategic port. Such security weaknesses, alongside the assassinations of senior commanders both inside and outside Iran, raise serious questions about the country’s internal vulnerability.

Social indifference: A bigger explosion

Beyond the material destruction, the public reaction to the catastrophe was itself shocking. Instead of empathy, some people opposed to the regime reacted with joy or indifference. The indifference coupled with public discontent toward the regime, risks creating fertile ground for further social division in the country, as some believe Israel, with tacit US backing, is pursuing a project to infiltrate and dismantle Iran’s infrastructure — from Bandar Abbas to military bases. 

Reports, such as those from FDD (Foundation for Defense of Democracies), suggesting the use of proxy actors for asymmetric operations reinforce this speculation. Meanwhile, public disillusionment with the Islamic Republic — which has made atrocities in Syria and Palestine seem ordinary to some — raises fears of a civil war or a “Libya-ization” scenario for Iran.

Is Iran at an impasse?

The Bandar Abbas explosion is not just a material disaster; it is a warning about Iran’s future. Poor crisis management, intelligence vulnerabilities, and social apathy have placed the country in a perilous position. If sabotage is confirmed, it shows that Israel can strike deep into Iran’s infrastructure — not just at ports. 

But the greater danger lies within: a society disillusioned with its rulers, sometimes seeing destruction as salvation. The regime’s repressive policies, combined with its security flaws, have opened the door to foreign enemies. When a strategic port operates without proper oversight, and when people celebrate tragedy instead of mourning, is Iran moving toward a fate similar to Syria’s? This explosion — beyond its 70 deaths and 1,240 injuries — is a siren warning of a future that could be more destructive than any bomb.