Cover of ARTICLE 19 report, image used with permission.
While the internet developed exponentially from the late 90s as a tool to enable largely universal, borderless and free flow of information across languages and countries, that concept started being challenged by a number of governments in the early 2000s by the opposite idea of internet sovereignty: the right to limit that free flow as it contradicts efforts by illiberal governments to delay, control, censor or delete content deemed a threat to their ideological discourse.
One of the earliest proponents of leaving the global internet was China which rapidly built in the mid-2000s its own intranet, isolated from the global one by a powerful censorship filter, known as the Great Firewall. From the perspective of Chinese authorities, this decision proved to be successful as over a billion users surf the net inside China daily, are provided all sorts of tools and platforms to interact privately and publicly, be informed and entertained, and conduct business, while Beijing filters and removes effectively, now with the help of AI, any content or accounts deemed undesirable.
China has thus demonstrated it is possible to have a modern society and economy and yet a strong censorship tool — something that other non-democratic states, such as Russia, are eager to emulate. Elsewhere in Asia, this model is also considered as attractive to balance economic development and political control. ARTICLE 19, a British human rights organization established in 1987 and taking its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, recently released a report in which it describes the importance of digital security norms increasingly imposed by China in the larger Asia-Pacific region, and contrasts them with Taiwan’s practice in this regard.
Global Voices interviewed Michael Caster, Head of Global China Programme, and his colleague Liu I-Chen, Asia Programme Officer, over email after conversations in Taipei to find out more about China's newest strategy in this regard.
Filip Noubel (FN): How do you assess the efficiency of the digital security norms developed by China? Does AI play a role?
Michael Caster (MC): China’s explicitly stated ambitions are to lead the world in AI technologies and governance norms. New and emerging technologies like AI have long been a strategic priority under the Digital Silk Road, as has heavy investment into domestic technological and normative development concerning AI. As seen with the release of China’s AI Global Governance Initiative during the Third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023, this trend is likely to continue. This raises a number of human rights concerns, especially related to the role of AI-enabled facial recognition in the context of Safe or Smart Cities.
Another element is in the digital governance of these technologies: the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) is one of the main party institutions responsible for cybersecurity governance but also in developing guidelines on generative AI. This alone raises freedom of expression concerns considering CAC’s role over censorship in China, but especially due to its dual role as part of the Central Propaganda Department. This is the concern: securitizing the information infrastructure leads to control over information flows.
As China strikes cooperation agreements with countries along the Digital Silk Road relating to AI enabled tools and technologies while concurrently promoting its own “best practice” in things like cybersecurity or AI norms and governance, we are likely to see greater adoption of China-style AI enabled techno-authoritarianism. China’s role in setting international norms and standards in this space, further calls for greater scrutiny, such as with a few years ago China’s public efforts to push its own facial recognition standards at the International Telecommunications Union.
FN: Can you describe the strategy, actors and tools involved in China's Digital Silk Road? Why do local — political and economic — elites in Asia-Pacific countries generally support this project?
MC: The year 2025 marks a decade since the National Development and Reform Commission really called the Digital Silk Road into existence with its 2015 white paper. Marking ten years of the Belt and Road Initiative, in October 2023 China hosted the third Belt and Road Forum and put out a white paper stressing its successes along the Digital Silk Road. At the forum, China launched an AI Global Governance Initiative firmly rooted in principles of cyber sovereignty, reiterated its ambition to lead in developing rules for global digital governance, and concluded several joint agreements, including with Pakistan, Indonesia, and Thailand, promising strengthened cooperation on areas such as 5G, smart cities, digital economy, and AI. It was also during the third Forum that Xi Jinping signaled intentions for China to move away from massive signature Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure projects of the first decade in favour of more “small yet smart” projects.
Some of the institutions involved in the development of digital cooperation and influence are party–state actors like the CAC and national tech champions like Huawei and ZTE. Major strategies deployed by such actors have combined information manipulation with technical people-to-people exchange, identifying real digital development needs. Elites in a number of Indo-Pacific countries have supported the project for varying reasons, as a means to achieve greater economic and especially digital development needs, sometimes intentionally coupled with a desire to model China’s authoritarian models to surveil or control their own populations.
FN : Your report focuses on Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. Why are those countries representative of China’s successful imposing of its cyber security model? Is there resistance from civil society or other actors in those three countries?
Liu I-Chen (LIC): In Indonesia’s case, its persistent governance gaps — particularly within resource-constrained institutions such as the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN) and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) — have contributed to an underdeveloped cybersecurity landscape, creating entry points for China's influence. A 2017 Memorandum of Understanding between BSSN and CNCERT/CC explicitly emphasized the principle of “cyber sovereignty” and initiated a series of joint training and capacity-building programs. These initiatives played a key role in normalizing China-aligned cybersecurity practices, embedding surveillance-enabling technologies and regulatory frameworks into Indonesia’s digital governance ecosystem.
Pakistan shows as a key testing ground under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Partnerships with firms like Huawei and ZTE have created deep infrastructural dependencies. The Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) also reflects core elements of the China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law — enabling censorship, surveillance, and data localization while restricting dissent. Pakistan’s implementation of a national Web Management System, inspired by China’s Great Firewall, also signals a shift toward centralized internet control, which risks internet fragmentation.
Vietnam’s 2018 Cybersecurity Law closely mirrors China's 2017 law, it shows how legal frameworks can draw explicitly from Chinese legal and policy models. Vietnam adopted key provisions such as data localization, real-name registration, and expansive content control under the banner of “cyber sovereignty.” Bilateral exchanges and internal party discourse influence this process in which the law redefines cybersecurity as regime security, targeting dissent and consolidating state control. Subsequent decrees further entrenched this alignment by granting sweeping surveillance powers and compelling platform compliance — demonstrating how Vietnam has institutionalized China's authoritarian digital governance framework.
Across all three cases, cybersecurity has been reframed as regime security, legitimizing repression under the banner of sovereignty.
FN: You contrast Taiwan as pretty much the opposite model of China’s digital governance. How did Taiwan manage to develop a human rights centric digital governance? Is it threatened by China’s hybrid warfare?
LIC: China has intensified its use of grey zone tactics, combining cyber operations with information and influence campaigns that promote unification narratives. According to Taiwan’s National Security Bureau, the Taiwanese government endured an average of 2.4 million cyberattacks per day in 2024 — double the 2023 figure of 1.2 million. Simultaneously, the V-Dem Institute ranks Taiwan as the most disinformation-targeted country globally.
Yet Taiwan represents a counter model to Beijing's authoritarian approach to cybersecurity governance: it promotes a participatory, multi-stakeholder model grounded in transparency, inclusion, and human rights. Cybersecurity is not framed as state domination but as a co-governance practice shaped by government, civil society, technologists, and the private sector. Public engagement platforms such as Join.gov.tw exemplify this approach that allows citizens to participate in debates on digital ID systems, data governance, and cybersecurity regulation. The government also has robust collaboration with the civic tech community, embedding grassroots expertise into digital governance.
However, Taiwan’s decentralized model also has its structural vulnerability. The decentralized governance model has led to coordination gaps and blurred lines of accountability across agencies. While Taiwan has robust cybersecurity actors, some of their mandates remain fragmented, and efforts to mainstream cybersecurity norms often lack sufficient political leadership from the Presidential Office and Executive Yuan [parliament]. At the international level, Taiwan will also need stronger presence at key norm-setting forums where the PRC actively promotes its cyber governance standards. The marginalization of Taiwan weakens Taiwan’s ability to defend rights-based approaches and amplifies Beijing’s normative influence.
Taiwan’s continued dilemma is that it must strengthen resilience against hybrid threats while resisting securitization that would undermine the very democratic principles it seeks to protect.
