A collage of Joko Widodo's legacies. From building the controversial new capital to raising a new political dynasty. Visual by @tsarolina. Used with permission.

Joko Widodo or Jokowi, Indonesia's former president (2014–2024), has joined a notorious roster of world leaders as a nominee for the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project's (OCCRP) 2024 Person of the Year in Organized Crime and Corruption. While Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad was given the infamous title, Jokowi shared the nomination spotlight with Kenyan President William Ruto, Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and Indian businessman Gautam Adani.

The ex-Indonesian president crafted his public image as a soft-spoken Heavy Metal enthusiast and people's champion — a political outsider who captivated voters and media outlets both at home and abroad. Through populist-transactional politics and by invoking nostalgia for the New Order — the 32-year authoritarian rule of Indonesia's second president, Suharto, marked by economic growth but also widespread corruption and human rights abuses — Jokowi secured a second term that lasted until 2024. During this period, he championed an ambitious plan to relocate Indonesia's sinking capital to the island of Borneo. More controversially, he orchestrated legal reforms that enabled his inner circle — including his sons, daughter, and in-laws — to assume strategic government positions, establishing what critics saw as a new political dynasty in Southeast Asia's largest democracy.

The OCCRP, a prominent network of investigative journalists, had cited serious concerns about his administration, including alleged human rights violations, election manipulation, natural resource exploitation, and systemic corruption that fostered political instability. The organization's selection process incorporated input from both readers and journalists worldwide, signaling mounting international scrutiny of corruption within Indonesia's political establishment. Speaking to reporters in his hometown of Solo, Jokowi addressed these allegations by suggesting they were part of a broader pattern of unsubstantiated claims circulating in Indonesia's political sphere.

Sekarang banyak sekali fitnah, banyak sekali framing jahat banyak sekali tuduhan-tuduhan tanpa ada bukti. Itu yang terjadi sekarang kan.

These days, there are so many slanderous accusations, so much malicious framing, so many allegations without evidence.

In 2014, hailed as Asia's Obama, Joko Widodo's rise to presidency featured Nawa Cita (Nine Priority Agenda), with anti-corruption reforms and clean governance as cornerstones of his vision for Indonesia. Foreign policy expert Joshua Kurlantzick observes how Jokowi quickly abandoned his reformist agenda once in office, making deals with the same political elites he had criticized during his campaign. By methodically dismantling the anti-corruption authorities and protecting civil rights, he emerged as another dynastic figure in Indonesian politics, building what Kurlantzick describes as “one of the country's most robust and possibly longest-lasting dynasties.”

The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI) documented this transformation through what they describe as a systematic dismantling of the country's anti-corruption framework, particularly the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), Indonesia's once-powerful anti-corruption commission. The foundation highlighted the February 2019 watershed moment when nine parliamentary factions approved revisions to the KPK Law, stripping the agency of its independence by placing it under presidential control. This institutional weakening was further solidified through Jokowi's controversial choice of Firli Bahuri, a police general known for his close ties to political elites, as KPK chairman. Under Firli's leadership, the commission proceeded to dismiss 51 of its most experienced investigators after they failed a newly mandated national insight test — moves that effectively defanged what was once Southeast Asia's most respected anti-graft institution.

The nomination polarized Indonesian legal experts. Some, like Albert Aries, a lawyer from Trisakti University, criticized what he called “trial by NGO” — using allegations without due process to judge a head of state. He argued that OCCRP's nomination amounted to an assault on Indonesian sovereignty itself, as Jokowi's decade of leadership represented the nation's constitutional governance.

Meanwhile, the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) argued that corruption should be viewed through a broader lens of “grand corruption” or “state capture,” pointing to how laws were changed to privilege certain figures and their families. The watchdog group noted the nomination was not surprising considering Jokowi's role in orchestrating the weakening of anti-corruption efforts, including the revision of the KPK Law, the appointment of controversial KPK leadership, the dismissal of KPK staff, and the reported hacking of activists who opposed these changes. Under Indonesian Law No. 31/1999 on Corruption Eradication — which defines seven types of corruption, including state financial losses, bribery, and conflicts of interest — traditional evidence of financial corruption might be harder to prove. However, ICW's coordinator, Wana Alamsyah, argued that focusing solely on legal definitions of corruption undermines the global discourse on systemic corruption.

Contoh paling sederhana adalah Soeharto. Dia tidak pernah diadili, tapi rakyat tahu bahwa dia korup.

Take Suharto as the simplest example. He was never tried in court, but the people knew he was corrupt.

A detailed release by the OCCRP explained their selection process, revealing that Jokowi's nomination emerged from more than 55,000 public submissions worldwide. While the organization acknowledged having no direct evidence of personal financial corruption by the former president, their panel of expert judges — comprising members from civil society, academia, and journalism — included him among the finalists based on his government's role in weakening Indonesia's democratic institutions.

The panel specifically cited the systematic dismantling of the anti-corruption commission and the manipulation of electoral and judicial systems to advance his eldest son's political career. This culminated in one of Indonesia's most controversial constitutional maneuvers: when the Constitutional Court, headed by Jokowi's brother-in-law Anwar Usman, effectively overturned age requirements that would have barred 36-year-old Gibran Rakabuming from the vice presidency.

The ruling bypassed Article 169 of the Election Law requiring candidates to be at least 40 years old, allowing Gibran to become Indonesia's youngest vice president under President Prabowo Subianto, a former military general who was once Jokowi's political rival before becoming his ally. The chief justice was later dismissed for ethics violations related to this decision. “There is clearly a strong perception among the citizenry of corruption,” OCCRP publisher Drew Sullivan noted, “and this should serve as a warning to those nominated that the people are watching, and they care.”

Jokowi's trajectory from a reformist outsider to OCCRP's corruption nominee reflects a familiar pattern in Indonesian politics, where promises of change often give way to entrenched power structures.