Image by Arzu Geybullayeva.

Turkey’s involvement in Syria is multifaceted. It supports the Syrian National Army (SNA). The latter has been fighting the U.S.-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Ankara views the latter as a direct threat over its alleged links to the outlawed Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), considered a terrorist organization by Turkey, the US and the EU. Since 2016, Turkey has launched a series of military operations in northern Syria with the goal of securing its southern border from Kurdish forces and establishing a “safe zone” for Syrian refugees. Turkey has been hosting millions of Syrian refugees since the start of the civil war in Syria in 2011. With Bashar al-Assad's fall on December 8, Ankara has emerged as a winner and key negotiator between Western stakeholders and the new government in Syria.

Syrians in Turkey

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in its more recent report, estimated that by September 2024, about 3.1 million Syrian refugees lived in Turkey. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), although open to the influx of refugees at first, changed its tune over the years, using them as a threat against the EU and a domestic political tool.

In 2016, the EU struck a refugee deal that had Turkey halt the flow of Syrian migrants to Europe in return for visa concessions and EUR 6 billion (approximately USD 6.7 billion) in aid for more than 3.5 million Syrians arriving in Turkey.

In July 2020, Turkey threatened to allow migrants free passage to Europe, which prompted the European Parliament to approve an additional EUR 500 million (USD 562 million) in financing for Turkey.

In 2021, the EU allocated EUR 3 billion (approximately USD 3.4 billion) to refugees for 2021–2023. Two EU officials who spoke to the Financial Times at the time said additional funds had been budgeted to extend aid to Turkey.

In May 2022, President Erdoğan unveiled a program to return some one million Syrian refugees to parts of northern Syria under its control — a U-turn on the President's previous promises not to send the refugees back. This decision was largely viewed as a tactical step for the president ahead of presidential and parliamentary elections, as many across the country blamed refugees for internal economic troubles.

Syrians reside in Turkey under temporary protection, which, according to some experts, has simplified the process of their deportation. “Since 2018, there have been repeated waves of deportations,” Anita Starosta from the organization Medico International said in an interview with DW.

Between January and December 2023, over 57,000 Syrians and other people were deported, according to Human Rights Watch, adding these deportations took place with the authorities pressuring “the border authorities to list the majority of border crossings as ‘returnees’ or ‘voluntary.’”

President Erdoğan said during a cabinet meeting in July this year that 670,000 Syrians already returned to areas “cleared of terrorism in northern Syria.” The president also added that he hoped one million more would return “when the housing projects implemented with the support of Qatar are completed.”

Ahead of general elections in Turkey, the use of anti- and pro-immigrant language in election campaigns dominated the headlines. More than 200,000 Syrian immigrants have been granted Turkish citizenship. Among them, many favoured the ruling AKP ahead of general elections, mostly out of concerns about their status in the country and potential deportation.

In 2022, the nationalist leader of the Zafer (Victory) Party, Ümit Özdağ, made “immigration the centerpiece of [the party's] election campaign” ahead of the general elections. He even commissioned a video entitled “Silent Occupation,” depicting a dystopian future in which Syrians have taken over Turkey, where Turks are not welcomed, banned from speaking their language, and are deprived of white-collar jobs — all linked to uncontrolled immigration of Syrian refugees that started in 2011.

The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and Nation Alliance’s presidential candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, also vowed to send Syrian refugees back within two years of the election. These promises never came to fruition as the opposition lost in the general elections. The latter, however, did not stop its anti-immigrant sentiments.

Neighborhoods with Syrian refugees have been subject to violent attacks, as recently as July 2024. The violence, documented over the summer, was likely “a trigger” over “Ankara-Damascus normalization,” reasoned journalist Ingrid Woudwijk in her analysis for TurkeyRecap. The violence erupted a mere two weeks after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad expressed interest in resuming talks — Turkey severed its ties in 2011 in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War.

In response to violence in Syrian neighborhoods in Turkey, images of burnt Turkish flags and counter-protests were reported to have taken place in northwestern Syria, including in those areas controlled by Turkish-backed forces. On July 2, Turkey closed a number of border crossings with Syria, including the Bab al Hawa, the main crossing for people and trade.

With the fall of Assad, Syrians in Turkey are considering going back even if the situation on the ground remains unstable. The latter is a point referred to by migration experts, warning that this is not the time to move too fast and make hasty decisions. In an interview with Turkey Recap, Omar Kadkoy, foreign policy and migration program coordinator at Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey, cautioned that although the “Hype is driving such expectations [immediate return], history tells a different story. Asylum seekers and refugees’ repatriation is nonlinear.” Instead of immediate repatriation, an “introduction of temporary visiting permits to help Syrians make more informed decisions about repatriation” would be more suitable, added Kadkoy.

Turkey's intervention in Syria

Since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Turkey carried out several military incursions in northwestern Syria in what Ankara described as preventive measures and a matter of national security. Turkey has also been backing anti-Assad forces in northern Syria. Syria's northeast is controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US ally led by the People's Protection Units (YPG), SPD's main fighting force. Turkey considers the YPG fighters the offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) — a group designated as a terrorist entity by the US and Turkey.

According to the International Crisis Group, the “two pillars of [Turkey's] national security policy are to prevent a further influx of refugees and to weaken, if not break, SDF (and by extension PKK) control of the northeast.”

For Assad's regime, which was backed by Russia and Iran, reconciliation involved Turkey pulling out all of its 10,000 troops and its support of rebel forces in northern Syria — “a precondition Ankara has called unacceptable, citing security concerns over Syrian Kurdish militants,” according to reporting of seasoned journalist Burcu Karakas for Reuters at the time.

In 2022, when the Russian-mediated talks between Turkish and Syrian officials were launched, similar protests took place in northern Syria. Then, the talks came to a dead end when Turkey refused to meet the Syrian government's demand to withdraw Turkish forces from northern Syria, said journalist Ezgi Akin, writing for AlMonitor.

Key players and groups

There are a number of key players and stakeholders involved in Syria who have their own interests. Chief among them is Turkey, with its support of the SNA, US and the SDF, and others like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a militant Islamist group. The latter, backed by a number of other fighter groups and the SNA, seized control of Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus, leading to Assad's eventual downfall and fleeing to Russia. In total, it took two weeks, starting on November 27, with the start of the major offensive until December 8, when the forces took control in Aleppo. Some experts say Turkey has some communication with the HTS. However, the extent to which Turkey can influence HTS is unclear.

There are other players, too, like Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and Israel, which has now expanded its occupation of the Syrian Golan to include much larger parts of the country.

The SNA recently took control of the towns of Tel Rifaat and Manbij. According to an analysis by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Manbij is key to Turkey's ambitions in Syria,” as it is “the last SDF-controlled area west of Euphrates” and “is key to Turkey's goal of pushing the SDF eastward beyond the river to thereby enable the SNA to advance toward the city of Kobane on the Turkish border.” Sinan Ciddi, who is a non-resident fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explained that the move was an opportunity for Turkey “to eliminate SDF” and thus “bolster his [Erdoğan's] domestic standing with voters.”

Ciddi's reference to voters is related to discussions that Erdoğan would need to seek constitutional changes if he were to run in the next presidential election scheduled for 2028. In its current form, the constitution limits the presidency to two terms of five years. Already, the legality behind President Erdoğan's candidacy in last year's general election was a point of debate. Nevertheless, he did run and secured victory in the second round of the presidential vote. In recent months, the ruling AKP, with its ultra-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) ally, has been exploring an opportunity to gain Kurdish party support before introducing constitutional amendments. In an attempt to do so, the leader of MHP, Devlet Bahçeli, delivered a surprising statement in October 2024 on the potential release of the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan and the re-opening of talks with the PKK.

Addressing his party at the parliament on October 22, Bahçeli said, “Let the terrorist leader unilaterally declare terrorism is over and that his organization has been dissolved.” Bahçeli even suggested that Öcalan could be invited to deliver this message at a parliamentary session of the People's Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party.

Earlier in October, Bahçeli also shook hands with the co-leader of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party, Tuncer Bakırhan. Bahçeli seems to also have secured approval from his ally Erdoğan, who said on October 12, “We find Mr. Bahçeli's attitude positive and meaningful for our country's struggle for democracy. We hope that the number of those who take these steps will increase in the future.”

The last time the ruling government attempted to engage with the PKK was as part of the peace process initiated from 2013–2015. Eventually, the peace talks fell through, and the group carried out a number of terrorist attacks across the country while Turkish military and security forces engaged in operations against the group in Iraq and Syria.

Kurds make up roughly 18 percent of Turkey’s population.

Cengiz Candar, a lawmaker for the pro-Kurdish DEM party in Turkey and a Middle East expert, said in an interview with AlMonitor that Turkey's endgame is to destroy Kurdish autonomy in Syria.” In his analysis for the Council on Foreign Relations, Henri J. Barkey wrote, “Ankara could be hoping that the incoming Donald Trump administration will decide to withdraw its nine hundred soldiers from Syria and end its support for the SDF.”

Whether Turkey can achieve its goals in Syria remains to be seen. As Walid El Houri recently wrote for Global Voices, “The fall of the dictatorship and the emotional, historic scenes of thousands of prisoners being released from brutal dungeons — some of whom had been missing for decades — brought a wave of relief and hope. However, these feelings are accompanied by profound fear. For many Syrians, the scars of war and repression remain fresh. Trust in political processes is fragile, and the absence of a clear roadmap for transition raises concerns about potential power vacuums or factional infighting.”