Screenshot of the Russia Post article. Published with permission from Russia Post.

Alexander Verkhovsky for Russia Post looks at the tightening of labor immigration legislation in Russia, along with recent actions taken by authorities, and argues that the government is trying to control migration rather than restrict it. Still, this control has a clear ideological aspect and is exacerbating anti-immigration sentiments. Global Voices published the article, edited for our audience, with permission from Russia Post. 

The summer of 2024 has been marked by an intensification of the fight against (real or imagined) threats associated with labor immigration, with the intensification observed at all levels of Russian society.

In June, there were reports of widespread police raids and an uptick in expulsions (in Russia, “administrative expulsion” is different from deportation, which is due to criminal charges). July saw major legislative activity on the issue of immigration, as well as something like a “Russian march” in the town of Korenovsk, Krasnodar Region, the march taking place without any interference from police. All this is happening amid constant discussion of a big shortage of labor.

At the same time, there are myriad complaints from citizens and politicians at various levels who are upset that thousands of immigrants from countries to Russia’s south and east who have accepted Russian citizenship do not register with the military and thus do not have to fight in Ukraine. Basically, part of the host population thinks the burden of the war [Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has lasted over 2 years already] is not being shared fairly.

Immigrant phobia vs the benefits of immigration

The most obvious factor can be seen in the word “immigrant” itself, or more precisely in the way it is most often used in colloquial speech. Someone with a UK passport is not considered an immigrant in Russia, for example, unlike a holder of an Uzbekistani one. Meanwhile, the aforementioned “new citizens” are still considered immigrants. The word is still used even in relation to native-born Russian citizens from outlying regions, primarily the North Caucasus.

In other words, the very term immigrant in its everyday use is racist and reflects a racist attitude toward a corresponding groups of people. Though the state suppresses the most radical forms of racist propaganda, generally it does not fight such racist attitudes and, perhaps, does not consider them a big deal.

Overall, deep-rooted racist attitudes toward several groups of people in Russia are a constant factor, pushing the government in the direction of a tougher migration policy.

Of course, racist attitudes cannot be openly shown at the official level, but sometimes they prove impossible to hide. For instance, in July, a Ministry of Internal Affairs lieutenant colonel reported at an official meeting he had received instructions from above to “whiten up” Moscow Region.

The labor shortage continues to grow, but it is due to many factors. Among them are the relative dynamics of economic development and currency exchange rates in Russia and in countries from where immigrants come, relative demographic trends, Russia’s immigration policy (the visa regime, the procedures for issuing various permits, how rigidly rules are enforced, corruption, etc.), and the war, which simultaneously demands more and more people on the battlefield, and also the assembly line, to make military equipment.

It is very difficult to assess how much the possibility of being forced to fight in Ukraine deters immigrants. They still end up there, with or without Russian citizenship, having signed a contract. Their number is unknown, but it is unlikely to be very large. For example, Russia’s Investigative Committee recently reported that 10,000 “new citizens” who had not registered with the military had been sent to the front.

Escalating immigrant phobia

Immigrants as a conceptual group have long been an irritant to a large part of the host population. Since 2011, the authorities have moved from  assertions about the need for tolerance and order to the formation of a doctrine that can be called official nationalism.

This doctrine promoted the political unity of citizens and nations around a Russian (russkoye)and Orthodox “civilizational core,” as opposed to ethnic nationalisms, including Russian ethnic nationalism. However, it did not really say anything about immigrants: apparently, they were perceived as temporary help and not part of Russian society, with no policy in relation to them actually needed.

A rather unfriendly regulatory regime for immigrants was coupled with action against their being overtly targeted as the government sought to minimize the risk of violence and instability. A mysterious breakdown in this policy occurred in 2013, when the authorities openly provoked anti-immigration sentiments and carried out widespread, demonstrative police raids, which quickly translated into a series of local riots. This campaign was abruptly curtailed when one such riot occurred on the outskirts of Moscow, in Biryulyovo Zapadnoye.

However, in 2021 the effort was resumed, and again for no apparent reason. Since then, it has only accelerated, with a six-month pause after the start of the special military operation [Russia's invasion of Ukraine]. Note that this is not just propaganda; it is also numerous police raids and restrictive initiatives coming out of nationalistic elements in society.

That process has generally accelerated since 2022, inevitably affecting the government position toward immigrants, though the thrust of the ideological mobilization is, of course, anti-Western.

Acceleration does not happen on its own. An obvious example is the reaction of the authorities and loyalists to the terrible terrorist attack in March at Crocus City Hall in Moscow.

Of course, the “immigrant threat” was talked about even before the terrorist attack, with such rhetoric intensifying in 2023. Already in 2023, the authorities fully condoned noticeably rising grassroots nationalistic vigilantism. After Crocus, however, everything intensified — raids, vigilantism (see Russia.Post here), and rhetoric.

The intensification of police raids is not something special either related to the terrorist attack or instituted over the last few years. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has always reacted this way to any high-profile immigrant-related incident, seeking to be seen “taking measures,” and raids are the simplest one, clearly visible to both society and the political leadership.

The scale of the raids after Crocus was large but not exceptional: unlike in 2013, immigrants were at least not marched in columns through the streets for the camera. Vigilantism on the part of nationalists also did not change much quantitatively. It is more about its gradual evolution and increasingly close cooperation between nationalists and the police. What has really changed, however, is the rhetoric.

Anti-immigration legislation

At the end of the legislative session in late July, two laws were passed. The first expanded the list of administrative offenses for which expulsion without trial is possible, while the second essentially did not place restrictions on immigration itself but made it easier to expel and deport immigrants and tightened monitoring of them.

The second law that was recently adopted is also interesting as it introduces restrictions on the civil rights of immigrants. For example, they are not allowed to make any public demands on the authorities and must follow the whole set of “traditional values”: marriage only between a man and a woman, “the inadmissibility of distorting historical truth” about World War II and so on. Not that there is much opposition to these values among immigrants. Moreover, today there are no signs that many immigrants are openly protesting anything.

Ideology outweighing pragmatism

At the same time, the authorities are whipping up negative sentiments toward immigrants and are clearly trying to control them ideologically. There are likely two goals here. The first: immigrants are probably still seen as a potential threat, and the current political regime prefers to neutralize any potential threat as much as it can and as far out as possible; the second: anti-immigration rhetoric is meant to introduce into the official nationalism the idea that “Russian civilization” must be protected not only from the West, which is overly modernized, but also from the south, which is not modernized enough.