Image by Arzu Geybullayeva

Armenia reducing mandatory classes taught in Russian language is the latest development in souring Russia–Armenia relations. According to reporting by OC media, the decision is related to a directive issued in July 2024 which would allow students a choice to study two separate foreign language courses, instead of having their first foreign language course in Russian by default. A series of decisions taken by the government of Armenia in recent years signals the country moving further out of Russia's orbit of influence. Whether it succeeds rests on a number factors, including reaching a final peace deal with Azerbaijan.

Away from Russia

Ever since the second Karabakh war that Armenia and Azerbaijan fought in 2020, Armenia has been on the path to distance itself from Russia and instead deepen its ties with the EU. Many in Armenia have become increasingly frustrated with the country’s traditional security partners, after both Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) failed to send assistance during Azerbaijani incursions into Armenia in 2021 and 2022. Azerbaijan is not a member of the CSTO, and members are treaty-bound to intervene when one of their own is attacked.

In 2022, Armenian authorities agreed to allow the European Union to dispatch a monitoring mission on its border with Azerbaijan, a move that was widely criticized by Russia at the time.

The EU first deployed the EU Monitoring Capacity in Armenia (EUMCAP) in October 2022 following a joint meeting in Prague between Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev facilitated by the EU Council President Charles Michel and French president Emmanuel Macron. Both the meeting and the decision to deploy the mission came a month after Azerbaijan launched an offensive inside Armenia. According to statements by both countries, more than 200 service personnel were killed as a result. On September 15, 2022, the two countries signed a ceasefire mediated by Russia.

In December 2022, Armenia requested another mission with the hope that its presence along the Armenian–Azerbaijani border would prevent further military escalations like the one in September 2022.

In February 2023, the EU deployed the EU civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA) with a two-year mandate. In December 2023, it announced it was increasing its presence on the ground from 138 to 209 staff. Both Russia and Azerbaijan criticized the deployment of the second mission. In their statements, officials of both countries questioned the purpose of the mission. Speaking at a news conference in Baku, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said the purpose of the mission was dubious “in terms of its legitimacy, functions, mandate, and duration,” echoing on Russia's earlier claims that the EU monitors “can only bring geopolitical confrontation to the region,” and accused the EU of pushing back “Russia's mediation efforts at any cost.”

The Nagorno-Karabakh area has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a war fought in the early 1990s, which ended with a ceasefire and Armenian military victory in 1994. In the aftermath of the first war, a new, internationally unrecognized, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was established. Seven adjacent regions were occupied by the Armenian forces. As a result of that war, “more than a million people had been forced from their homes: Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan,” according to the International Crisis Group.

The tensions lingered over the following decades, culminating in the second Karabakh war in 2020 and the military operation in September 2023. The latter paved the way for Azerbaijan to regain full control over Karabakh. However, despite reassurances that Karabakh Armenian rights’ would be protected and preserved, 104,000 Karabakh Armenians fled following the September 2023 offensive, according to the most recent data.

In September 2023, the government of Armenia sent its first humanitarian aid to Ukraine since Russia's full scale invasion of the latter in 2022. The same month Armenia’s defense ministry announced that a joint military training exercise with the US would take place from 11–20 September 2023 in Armenia to help train Armenian forces for peacekeeping missions.

In October 2023, Armenia’s Parliament adopted a law on ratifying the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute despite Kremlin's repeated warnings Armenia ratifying the document would have “the most negative consequences for bilateral relations.” The ICC issued an arrest warrant for President Putin for alleged war crimes committed in Ukraine in March 2023. Ratifying the Rome Statute means amongst other commitments, arresting Russia’s president Vladimir Putin if he were to enter Armenia.

Armenia decided to freeze its membership to the Russian-led CSTO in February 2024 following the deadly flare-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan. At least four Armenian servicemen were reportedly killed and one wounded in the first fatal incident on February 13, 2024, since the September 2023 military offensive.

Armenia has since refused to host and take part in multiple CSTO drills and meetings, and even refused to send a representative to serve as the CSTO’s deputy secretary general.

On March 12, 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution “On closer ties between the EU and Armenia and the need for a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”

With over 500 MePs in favor, four against, and 32 abstentions, the resolution “recognizes and welcomes” Armenia's “desire to enhance and prioritize relations with the European Union,” calling the partnership between Armenia and the EU a “logical step in aligning with Armenia's choice in favor of democracy, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and respect for the international rules-based order.”

The resolution followed explicit intentions expressed by Armenia to apply for EU candidacy and a partnership agenda announced by the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell in February 2024.

In April 2024, Armenian officials attended a trilateral meeting with the EU and US in  Brussels. The meeting was highly criticized by the government of Azerbaijan on the grounds that it would negatively affect the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as per a statement from Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But the meeting was not at all about Azerbaijan nor the peace process.

In June 2024, Armenia's Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated the government's decision to leave the CSTO. The commitment to leave the alliance was likely propelled following leaked documents showing Belarus, also an alliance member, sending military hardware to Azerbaijan between 2018–2022.

The same month, following the visit of Assistant Secretary of State James O’ Brien to Yerevan, the US promised to deepen its ties with the country.

In July 2024 Russia criticized Armenia for participating in a NATO summit in Washington, calling Armenia’s move to deepen ties with NATO and its member states “imprudent.” Russian deputy foreign minister Mikhail Galuzin, commenting on the meeting at the time said:

углубляя такими темпами сотрудничество с теми, чья цель — “стратегическое поражение” России, Ереван своими руками рискует серьезно дестабилизировать обстановку на Южном Кавказе в ущерб в том числе собственной безопасности

by deepening cooperation at such a pace with those whose goal is the “strategic defeat” of Russia, Yerevan with its own hands risks seriously destabilizing the situation in the South Caucasus, to the detriment of its own security.

The same month, the EU unveiled an action plan that would liberalize visas for Armenian citizens. The EU is also expected to approve SUR 10 million in non-lethal military aid for Armenia through its European Peace Facility mechanism.

According to a public opinion survey commissioned by the International Republican Institute and conducted last December, 87 percent of those surveyed thought positively of Armenian–EU relations.

In August 2024, Russian border guards stationed at Yerevan’s Zvartnots Airport officially left their stations. Russia had manned Armenia’s borders, including Zvartnots Airport, since the country's independence. The withdrawal came following another agreement in May in which Armenia and Russia agreed to the latter's withdrawal of its border guards stationed across several other Armenian regions.

Also in August, United States confirmed that it was mulling over an agreement with Armenia that would “allow the United States to transfer nuclear technology to Armenia, as well as share research and technical knowledge,” according to reporting by Eurasianet and Civilnet.

How Armenia moves forward remains to be seen, and  will be dependent on a number of factors, as per analysis by Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and regional expert. Among these factors, is reaching a final peace deal with Azerbaijan. He said:

A successful process would mean Armenia would have more options and would be able to lessen its historical dependence on Russia and pursue a stronger partnership with the West. A continuation of the status quo gives Russia more opportunities to reapply its traditional levers of control.