One has to wonder at the kind of propaganda that ensured that Ranil would lose the elections. Among other things – the boycott by LTTE, and posters like the one posted above. As Indi.ca explains –
This is put up by the SLFP or JVP or somebody. Ranil Wickremesinghe is reputedly gay, and this is a poster of him as Micheal Jackson, surrounded by boys.
Yaaro at La-la Land stayed up impatiently waiting for news from her parents with regards to the election and was disappointed by Ranil losing and Mahinda winning. Morquendi however, asks if the elections were actually free and fair
Mahinda did win the South. There's no question about that. But just how much did vote rigging effect the result? Well, not much really. But then, the margin between the two candidates is not much either is it? So did the vote rigging in the South have an impact on the result of the election?
Morquendi also asks some other uncomfortable questions about the implications of Ranil winning on votes that were largely Sinhala, and asserts that the victor for Ranil means a defeat for Sri Lanka – the Sri Lanka that has both Sinhala and Tamil people. Indi on why he thinks Ranil lost. He has more on the LTTE disenfranchising the people they claim to represent.
Pickled Politics states the election result as the end of a dynasty in Sri Lankan politics.
In a vein similar to its neighbours, Sri Lankan politics revolves around personalities rather than policies. Votes are cast out of loyalty, for either familial or personal reasons – it’s a known fact that corruption, with it’s financial and protective privileges, will seep through to the party that wins, so politicians are required to work a different angle to make sure the license to import luxury foreign cars on a tax-exemption is theirs and theirs only!
Deane's Dimension has posts on why the Sri Lankan blogosphere seems to be pretty upset about Ranil's loss, and why it's difficult to understand LTTE's sudden and unacceptable boycott of the election.
18 comments
Here’s wishing all Americans a happy Thanksgiving Day as you gather at your tables with family and friends to celebrate the many blessings of freedom and liberty we enjoy in our country.
From this household we send along our special thanks to the men and women in uniform, here at home and overseas, and especially to those fighting the global war on terrorism in far away Afghanistan and Iraq. Your courage and your sacrifices are bringing freedom to millions and your hard fought battles eradicating terrorism, making this troubled world of ours safer. We thank, too, the families of our soldiers, sailors, and Marines, and pray that they are soon rejoined with their loved ones in uniform.Most of all, this family asks for God’s blessings and guidance for our nation’s president, vice president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, and all those who serve us at the highest levels of government during this time of war. Give them respite this day from their worries and burdens and touch their hearts, minds and souls with Your divine wisdom, Oh Lord. FOLLOW-UP: A Thanksgiving Day Proclamation by the President of the United States of America.
President Mahinda Rajapakse says his government will give the highest priority to commence the peace process
President Mahinda Rajapakse says his government will give the highest priority to commence the peace process in order to bring a lasting peace to the country. Opening the session of the 6th Parliament today the President said the government is fully prepared to conduct direct talks with the LTTE. The government will stick to a negotiated means instead of war. He stressed that the path of peace will not be smooth but the government will strictly adhere to this option. He also pointed out such a solution will be found through a majority consensus and in a manner the rights of all communities are guaranteed.
The President elaborated on the government policy regarding the issue of solving the ethnic conflict. The process will be an open and a transparent one. Special attention will be paid to prevent child conscription, safeguarding human rights, national security and avoiding occurrence of any terror act. The present ceasefire agreement will be revised by introducing an open and transparent ceasefire monitoring mechanism. The peace efforts of the United National Front collapsed due to restricting the peace process only to the government and the LTTE.
The President promised to bring about a new peace process that accommodates views and opinions of all parties in place of the bilateral peace process. He further expressed that a structure of governance that safeguards the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country will be introduced with a power devolution system.
The President said Sri Lanka will be transformed to a powerful country in the global economy while paying adequate attention to social equality. A new economic programme will also be formulated to acquire a rapid economic development by utilizing the maximum investment opportunities at local and international level. The positive aspects of the free market economy will be incorporated in this endeavor. The state sector will be strengthened to match the modern days. The salaries of the state sector employees will also be increased. The cooperation of the opposition will also be sought to revise the procedures of the Parliament and to safeguard its supremacy. The revenue system will be regularized in keeping with the budget deficit.
Tigers two pronged strategy- Taraki, 1989
On the 3 December 1989 issue of Sri Lanka’s English daily, Island International, late Dharmeratnam Sivaram, popular journalist and Senior editor at TamilNet, writes on LTTE’s ascendency after the collapse of the Indo-Lanka accord. Beginning of withdrawal of Indian troops, JVP insurrection in the South that made Sri Lanka a killing field, and the start of Premadasa-LTTE talks provide the political context to the article.
“As the last Indian soldier leaves the shores of Sri Lanka and the North east Provincial Council crumbles with the imminent “re-induction” of his troops in the North and East, Prabhakaran has scored another point to support his longstanding claim: the only solution to the woes of the Tamil people is Thamileelam. Posters put up by the LTTE in Colombo and in the North and east last week to celebrate “the great heroes day” proclaimed the LTTE motto, “The thirst of the Tigers is for the motherland of Thamileelam.” Dr Balasingham and Yogi made it clear they had no hand in the actions of the Sri Lankan forces that saw the TNA [Tamil National Army] retreat from Ampara when they addressed public meetings at Pottuvil and Thambiluvil last week. They were trying to counteract Perumal’s persistent claim that they were operating hand-in-glove with the STF. Their concern to rectify the damage done to their nationalist image by this is evident.
From its inception the LTTE had a two-pronged strategy. One, to militarily struggle towards separation; the other to politically emasculate or physically eliminate those sections and individuals in the Tamil community having a manifest inclination to compromise, who had influence or were gaining it.
The two objectives are being strengthened once again with the imminent departure of the Indian forces.
Firstly, the LTTE’s morale has received a tremendous boost from the fact that it was the only force in Sri Lanka to have taken up arms to effectively oppose the presence of the Indian forces. Secondly, in the eyes of the Tamils, the Provincial Council- the latest post independence ‘solution’ to the problem of Tamils- and Varatharajah Perumal, who has spoken in the name of unity and integrity of Sri Lanka, may now both appear ephemeral. This would appear to strengthen the LTTE’s point that compromise does not politically gain anything for the Tamils. (Yogi said in Thambiluvil that the Provincial Council was nothing more than a Village Council.)
TULF’s decline:
The campaign against the DDC’s [District Development Council’s] was the beginning of the TULF’s decline. The TULF’s compromise on the DDCs and their decision to participate in their election was the basis on which their general alienation began. For the LTTE, the 1977 elections were only a ‘referendum’ which confirmed the Tamil people’s commitment to a separate state. The Tiger claim is that they and only they have not betrayed the mandate given by the Tamil people and that their struggle for a separate state is based on this mandate. The latest issue of the pro-LTTE paper “Unmai” condemns the Northeast Provincial Council as one that has shamelessly sold the Tamils and the Tamil soil. The paper constantly endeavors to portray Perumal as a traitor. The style and content are reminiscent of the anti-TULF literature of the early 1980’s put out by almost all the militant groups.
In 1983, when PLOTE was the first militant organization to warn of ulterior and deleterious Indian designs on the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka with the publication of a book “Vankam Thantha Padam” (The Lesson that was Bangladesh) the LTTE had not come to face with the so-called geopolitical realities.
The “Broken Palmyrah” says: “And it [the LTTE] was falling short by not conceptualizing India’s needs and aspirations so as to construct a path of accommodation of the geopolitical reality without total dependency and capitulation.” (But on the other hand, the ‘terrorist interpretation’ of Hegel may have it that ‘success decides the truth’).
In early 1986 the LTTE exterminated TELO in a ruthless and bloody massacre and told the Tamil people they had done so because TELO was acting in the interest of India. At that time, this view came as a surprise to many among the Tamils who continued to look upon India as the ultimate guarantor of whatever Sri Lankan Government might concede. From then on, the LTTE made all efforts to make it clear to the people that India’s assistance was appreciated, but not its interference.
LTTE’s tactics:
Despite criticism about the LTTE’s naive attitude towards India, its propaganda continued to be directed against any compromise with the Sri Lankan government on the basis of India’s various proposals. In 1986, the LTTE went so far as to solicit the support of the EPRLF, PLOTE and Panagoda Maheswaran’s TEA- all of whom were extremely suspicious of the Tigers because of what they had done to TELO only a few months before- to organize a mass rally to protest the talks in Colombo. By January 1987, the LTTE had created a situation on the ground in the North and East where for either India or Sri Lanka, there were only the Tigers to reckon with. The LTTE’s solution to the intricacies of ‘geopolitical reality’ was to make itself the sole representative of the Tamils so that regional hegemony or Sri Lankan diplomacy would have no way of advancing its interests without this being in some way tactically advantageous to the LTTE.
Nevertheless, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord opened an avenue which the LTTE thought would never open. The Accord brought Colombo as a direct factor into Tamil militant politics for the first time. The Indian Army in the North and East and the training and weapons given just before the Accord made it possible for the other groups to function and enter into dialogue with Colombo. The LTTE was once again faced with a threat of ‘compromise’ which they assumed they had banished for good or exterminated.
If a solution put forward by the Sri Lankan government and the Indian Government and sustained by the world’s largest army could fall like a domino, then what will save the Tamils from their misery? It now seems that once the Indian army withdraws completely, only the LTTE will be around, with its ultimate remedy. Like Amirthalingam, Perumal also has to be politically emasculated. Therefore, effecting a legal dissolution of the Northeast Provincial Council and a subsequent rout of Perumal- which would be guaranteed by popular support in the North and domination on the ground in the East- in fresh elections, would leave the LTTE as the only credible representative of the Tamil people and its goal, Thamileelam.
Delhi’s primary objective once all its soldiers have come back home will be to have a war going on between the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government which would be the only way of justifying India’s intervention in Sri Lanka and the Accord. Such a situation could suit the LTTE’s basic purpose quite well since it would give them a predominant position once again with Delhi’s blessings. They will use this position to eliminate all possibilities that would allow either Colombo or Delhi to apply a divide-and-manipulate-to-one’s advantage policy.”
Post election blues with or without the blues!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Within You, Without You – this is one of my favorite songs
“We were talking…
about the space between us all
and the people
who hide themselves behind a wall
of illusion
never glimpse the truth
when it’s far too late…
when they pass away…..
We were talking about the love we all could share
when we find it…
to try our best to hold it there
(with our love)
With our love we could save the world,
If they only knew…….
Try to realize its all within yourself
no one else can make you change,
And to see you’re really only very small
and life goes on within you
and without you.
We were talking
about the love that’s gone so cold
And the people
who gain the world and lose their soul
they don’t know
they cant see..
Are you one of them?…
When you’ve seen beyond yourself
then you may find peace of mind is waiting there
And the time will come when you see
we’re all one and life goes on within you and without you.”
Presidential elections have shaken the kaleidoscope of Sri Lankan politics and the pieces will undoubtedly take a while to settle. Nevertheless, there are many lessons to be drawn from the results, as underlined by the intense soul-searching and horse-trading in Colombo. Despite numerous controversies, including the near total Tamil boycott, Mahinda Rajapakse of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) has convincingly defeated Ranil Wickremesinghe of the main opposition United National Party (UNP). Many, not least those supportive of Wickremesinghe, point to the narrow margin: Rajapakse took 50.3% against Wickremesinghe’s 48.4%.
But the inferences they suggest may be drawn from figures are misleading. Whilst Wickremesinghe’s tally is compiled from a number of vote banks, including those of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Upcountry parties – including the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) – as well as the UNP’s loyalists, Rajapakse clearly won over the overwhelming majority of the Sinhalese. What can be inferred of Ranil’s ‘support’, furthermore, when the possibility that the SLMC and CWC might switch and join Rajapakse’s SLFP in government is being floated in Colombo? What is clear, therefore, is that the Sinhalese have overwhelmingly backed Rajapakse and his hardline stance on the peace process with the Tamils while Wickremesinghe’s minority allies’ supported him not on his peace platform per se, but his pledges of post-victory political largess. The notion that last week’s election was a referendum on the peace process is thus only partly true; patronage clearly played its part.
The main controversy of the elections was undoubtedly the Tamil boycott. Less than 1% of Jaffna’s voters participated – and only 1 person from Kilinochchi’s 90 odd thousand people. Colombo’s Tamils also stayed away and in the multi-ethnic eastern province, few Tamils participated. That Tamils were undecided as how to vote has been clear for some time. The months of criticism in the Tamil press and popular disgruntlement over the lack of normalcy in the Northeast after four years of ceasefire should have alerted everyone, not least the UNP, that the Tamil vote could not be taken for granted. Instead, there is now vehement condemnation of the Liberation Tigers for inspiring the boycott. In the east some crossing points were blocked by LTTE supporters and, reportedly, cadres. These incidents have been rendered emblematic of the entire Tamil boycott and, amid sensational press coverage, is obscuring a stark ethnic polarisation amongst Sri Lankans.
The UNP and its leader must take the blame for his failure to bring the Tamils out in its favour. It may be easier – and certainly more comforting – to write off the Tamil boycott as a consequence of LTTE coercion, as many, including some members of the international community, have. But to assume that Tamils saw the ‘obvious’ benefit for peace of having Wickremesinghe as President is to misunderstand both Tamil sentiments and, we suggest, the man and his party. The UNP is gripped this week by internal post-poll wrangling: but the debate is not about the Tamils and the peace process, but how to recover the Sinhala heartland. Supports of the liberal peace in Sri Lanka undoubtedly would have preferred a Wickremesinghe win. But to fixate on the LTTE and any role it may or may not have had is to ignore the overarching dynamic: the Sinhalese have swarmed to support Rajapakse and his ultra-nationalist platform.This – and the Tamil boycott – should not be a surprise to close observers of Sri Lanka’s politics. Resentments and antagonism have long been part of the vernacular streets, both Tamil and Sinhalese. Before the elections Wickremsinghe did not utter a word on sharing tsunami aid with LTTE areas or setting up an interim administration for the Northeast – remember the ISGA? But these factors have simply been ignored amid misguided confidence that the hardline platform trod by Rajapakse and his allies, the ultra nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP) and hardline monks party, the Jeyatha Hela Urumaya (JHU), would make Wickremesinghe the Tamils’ de facto choice. The UNP leader did absolutely nothing to build bridges with the Tamils. Moreover, he – as many are equally erroneously doing now – assumed that the Tamil constituency can be separated from the LTTE.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse’s first address to his Parliament had been keenly, albeit warily, anticipated by those concerned about the peace process. Elected on a hard-line nationalist platform (and having easily drawn the majority of Sinhala votes), Rajapakse’s speech curiously received the press coverage of a pro-peace candidate: that he wanted to hold “direct” talks with the Liberation Tigers. But peace advocates paying close attention to his policy statement would have been thoroughly alarmed.
Not only does Rajapakse seem to have foreclosed negotiations with the LTTE by ruling out discussion on the immediate and ‘core’ issues in Sri Lanka’s peace process, he is proposing the dismantling of its foundations: the February 2002 ceasefire and Norwegian facilitation.
Within hours of the Sri Lanka’s election commission announcing Mr. Rajapakse’s vote tally had surpassed the requisite 50%, the New Norwegian government extended its congratulations and extended a clear offer to resume peace facilitation.
But President-elect Rajapakse did not respond. Indeed, he did not even acknowledge Oslo’s extended hand either at his swearing in speech or in the days afterwards.
Through the furore over the boycott and the horse-trading for cabinet posts which gripped Colombo last week, his deafening silence has been unsettling the optimists who had hoped the practicalities of power would prevail over rash campaign promises. Their growing anxieties were confirmed Friday.
Whilst the Lankan President has called for ‘direct’ talks – which, in the context of a marginalized Oslo, means something less promising than many of Friday’s press reports have assumed – he has rejected both the immediate and strategic agendas that the Tamils might have expected the LTTE to put on the table.
Sri Lankan President entering the chamber of Parliament Friday
With regards a permanent solution, Rajapakse bluntly rejected the concept of a Tamil homeland and the notion of self-determination. That has effectively put paid to the notions of power-sharing, federalism etc, given that these are underpinned by both the homeland concept and the ‘internal’ self-determination principle.
With regards immediate issues that talks might have focused on, Rajapakse has, firstly, rejected the idea of sharing tsunami related aid pledged by international donors with the LTTE.
Dismissing the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (PTOMS), the internationally-backed joint mechanism signed by his predecessor, Rajapakse has said only the Jaya Lanka” (Victory to Lanka) reconstruction programme run by the government will handle tsunami funds.
Given that aid has been used by the international community as an inducement to both sides for talks – a sweetener or, more realistically, a cold conditionality – Rajapakse’s refusal to share aid with the Tigers severely reduces the draw of peace talks for them.
Rajapakse delivering policy speech
More important is his refusal to countenance an interim administration. Whilst the matter did not even merit comment – and given President Rajapakse’s well known hard-line positions, no one really expected it to – it would undoubtedly have been a strong draw for the LTTE.
In effect, whilst there is, in principle, an offer for the LTTE to come for negotiations, both the short term and long term matters the LTTE might have been tabled have already been ruled out. What, the Tigers might ask, are we to talk about?
Given this, President Rajapakse pointedly did not put forward an alternative agenda. He repeated the abstract declaration of his election campaign – “the political solution to a lasting peace should be based on a consensus reached through discussions among all parties linked to the problem and it should receive the approval of majority of the people of this country.”
The latter simply means the Sinhala majority must endorse the solution, but it is not clear who are to come to the consensus. It is also not clear what – if self-determination and territory-linked power sharing are ruled out – what the consensus is to be reached on.
Amid these confusions are, of course, the sweeping structural changes to the peace process that President Rajapakse has proposed – and which he seems determined to unilaterally carry out.
To begin with, he seems to have ruled out a major role for the Norwegians. Without a single reference to Oslo, he cryptically declared to Parliament: “the facilitation and mediation extended by the United Nations and other such organizations that support peace in Sri Lanka, all friendly countries, the international community, India and other regional states will be properly organized and utilized to strengthen the peace process.”
What this means is open to interpretation, but clearly Norway is not welcome – a point made more explicit by the bitter tirade against Oslo unleashed by Rajapakse’s campaign partners, the Janatha Vimukthi Perumana (JVP).
Seasoned observers of Sri Lanka’s conflict are well aware of the difficulties of finding a mutually acceptable peace broker who would also be prepared to stake their reputation on resolving it. In the light of the past week, that might now include Norway also.
The LTTE has not made any comment this week and undoubtedly the Heroes Day address on Sunday by the movement’s leader, Vellupillai Pirapaharan, will shed considerable light on the movement’s stance on the peace process.
But what is clear is that Sri Lanka’s new leadership is tossing out the remaining struts of the peace process one by one.
The most dangerous of these is Rajapakse’s declaration “the current ceasefire Agreement will be revised to … safeguard national security, prevent terrorist acts, … and introduce an open and transparent ceasefire monitoring machinery.”
Mr. Mahinda Rajapakse What this means is unsettlingly unclear. The agreement, as might be expected by definition, was reached between the two protagonists by a process of negotiation. The February 2002 bilateral truce, moreover, replaced two parallel, but unilateral ceasefires being observed by the LTTE and the United National Front (UNF) government.
As a signatory, Sri Lanka is locked into the internationally monitored truce. Any revision requires the consent of the LTTE – and that includes any changes to the structure or makeup of the supervision – the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).
The LTTE has refused to countenance a revision of the agreement or the monitoring mission, but has agreed to discuss implementation of the truce.
The question then is whether the Lankan President going to take Sri Lanka out of the agreement. It doesn’t take much imagination to envisage what might happen.
The definition “supreme authority within a territory,” captures the essential notion of sovereignty used to describe political authority of modern nation states. The origins of Sri Lanka’s long festering conflict lie in its unitary constitution which vests the exercise of sovereignty solely in the hands of Sinhala Buddhists. But Colombo wields no sovereign authority over nearly seventy percent of the island’s NorthEast. Radical Sinhala groups view the denial of their state’s sovereignty in areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers with extreme chagrin. Over the years, other events too have challenged Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.
Mahinda Rajapakse
Unitary constitution remains the cornerstone of Sri Lanka’s new President Mahinda Rajapakse’s peace policy. This is shaped by the nationalist forces including Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU). Rajapakse’s victory reflects majority electorate’s view that he will be a bulwark against further encroachment by the LTTE into Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.
SJV Chelvanayakam
Tamils’ demand for self-determination in the past three decades posed persistent challenges to Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. Tamils have consistently articulated in 1969 (Kodeeswaran challenge to language act), 1972 (Tamil boycott of Republic), 1975 (By-election of SJV Chelvanayagam), 1976 (Vaddukoddai resolution), 1977 (General election), 1985 (Thimpu talks) and 2003 (ISGA), with increasing vigor, that they have never acceded their sovereignty to the Sri Lankan state. Successive Governments have tried to introduce punitive legal measures, sought to enter into agreements with Tamil leaders, or used violence to contain Tamil dissent without much success.
Pirapaharan signing the MoU
Sovereignty has Internal and external dimensions.
“A sovereign state should have the sovereign will and right to enter into any relationship with any other sovereign state in its best national interests. The Indo Lanka Treaty clipped Sri Lanka’s sovereign right to freely enter into military or intelligence relationships with any external power other than India. It is India, and not Sri Lanka, that is legally entitled to draw the line regarding Sri Lanka’s external military and intelligence relationships,” a popular military analyst wrote pointing out the onset of erosion of Sri Lanka’s external sovereignty.
Diplomats from Embassies from European countries and from Canada visiting LTTE leaders in Killinochchi (Click on the image for a larger version)
When President Jayewardene signed the Indo Lanka Accord, Sri Lanka lost its sovereignty over its internal affairs too. Article 2.16 (e) of the treaty states, “The governments of India and Sri Lanka will co-operate in ensuring the physical security and safety of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern Provinces,” the analyst adds noting similar erosion of Sri Lanka’s internal sovereignty.
Although Indo-Sri Lanka Accord marked the beginning of GoSL relinquishing political authority to a State other than itself, India’s political incursions went unnoticed, as they did not manifest in issues that challenged Sri Lanka polity openly.
LTTE delegation visiting countries in Europe meeting with Government officials (Click on the image for a larger version)
Provisions defining lines of control in the Memorandum of Understanding Agreement (MoU) of 23 February 2003 on the ceasefire between the LTTE and GoSL marked for the first time in the history of Tamil struggle a territory, where sovereignty of Sri Lanka Government did not reign, was formally accepted by both warring sides.
Article (1.4): “where forward defence localities have been established, the GOSL’s armed forces and the LTTE’s fighting formations shall hold their ground positions, and article (1.5): “In areas where localities have not been clearly established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GOSL and the LTTE, respectively, on 24 December 2001 shall continue to apply…,” have given the LTTE the space and legitimacy to continue to build its parallel state structure within the lines of control.
Tryggve Tellefsen
Following the signing of MoU on March 25, 2002 LTTE’s political strategist, Mr. Anton Balasingham, arrived from Maldives in a seaplane which landed on the Iranaimadu irrigation tank in the LTTE controlled region. Although Sri Lanka’s formal diplomatic procedures including stamping of visa were carried out the event symbolized LTTE’s desire to present NorthEast as a loosely coupled entity with Sri Lanka proper. Pictures of the event are etched in Sri Lankans’ psyche.
Liberation Tigers celebrating the legitimacy acquired thorough the CFA, started exhibiting the symbolism by hoisting Tamil eelam flags, declaring a national flower, in addition to setting up more concrete administrative structures including Tamil Eelam Police force, Tamil Eelam courts and formality rich customs at Omanthai, Muhamalai check points to project an image of a defacto separate state functioning in NorthEast.
Kofi Annan
Recognition afforded to the LTTE by diplomats visiting Kilinochchi to meet with LTTE leadership has been another significant development that followed the MoU. Senior leaders of LTTE also made frequent visits to Europe, meeting with European Government officials showcasing the increasing levels of diplomatic recognition international community, especially the European nations, were prepared to provide to the Tigers.
Recent EU’s punitive measures against the LTTE strengthened Rajapakse’s presidential candidacy. Sinhala nationalists began to see Rajapakse as one who can reverse the LTTE’s progress towards its separatist goal.
Tigers demonstrated the support of Tamil intellectuals to their nation building project by drawing on diaspora talent pool in forming a formidable team of lawyers and academics from UK, US and Australia, to draft the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposals. ISGA rejects the unitary constitution and calls for radical restructuring of Sri Lanka’s polity reflecting LTTE’s goal of moving towards a confederal arrangement. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a key member of ruling alliance rejected the ISGA and ruled out resuming peacetalks based on ISGA.
Eric Solheim
Norwegian facilitators and often the Nordic members of the SriLanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) have been accused of bias towards the LTTE not only by the extremists but even by members of Sri Lanka’s Foreign Ministry.
LTTE also challenged Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over maritime and air space.
Following incidents at sea that threatened the stability of the Cease Fire, both sides agreed after the Sixth Round of Peace Talks in Japan on 18 March 2003 to work out effective arrangements for the operation of their naval units in keeping with existing treaty obligations. In a resulting discussion paper Major General (ret.) Tryggve Tellefsen, head of SLMM, wrote: “…LTTE Sea Tigers exists as a De Facto Naval Unit…to maintain their Forces’ capabilities both Parties must have the right to carry out training and exercise in designated areas.” Sri Lanka’s President declared Tellefsen as persona non-grata and requested Norway to replace him after local media blamed Tellefsen for violating Sri Lanka’s sovereignty in maritime waters.
Air-space controversy was triggered by the alleged discovery of light-aircrafts in Kilinochchi and of landing strip together with missile homing electronics in Iranaimadu.
Prince Charles
GoSL had to grapple territorially sensitive issues related to visits by diplomats and head of states in the wake of Tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004. Colombo successfully blocked UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s intended visits to NorthEast of Sri Lanka and to meet with Tigers. Later when Annan sent a message of condolence on the assassination of LTTE’s Lt Col Kausalyan Colombo was irked at the recognition afforded to the LTTE and demanded the resignation of UN’s Sri Lanka representative.
US former Presidents Bill Clinton and George H Bush were successfully stopped from visiting NorthEast. The Tamil National Alliance (TNA) was deliberately excluded from a State Dinner given to the ex-Presidents by the President of Sri Lanka. As LTTE’s proxy TNA has earned the wrath of Ms Kumaratunge as LTTE’s continued to captialize on tsunami aftermath to assert its independence.
Peter Harrold
Prince Charles privy to more detailed knowledge on disaster hit areas succeeded in visiting Tamil areas of Batticaloa but avoided contacts with the LTTE. His visits to Hindu temples were widely publicized in the western media.
Outbursts against the World Bank and western NGOs during Ms Chandrika presidency were rooted in ‘sovereignty fears’ that haunt the Sinhala nation’s psyche.
Sri Lanka Country Director for the World Bank Peter Harrold’s alleged statement saying that the LTTE was running an “unofficial state” in Northeastern Sri Lanka, and was therefore a “legitimate stakeholder” in the reconstruction phase brought wide condemnation from the GoSL, Sinhala nationalists and media in the South.
These incidents and attempts by Sinhala nationalists to block Tigers’ attempt to settingup financial channels directly with funding agencies bypassing control by Sri Lanka’s treasury, can be viewed as a calculated reaction to fears that Tigers are rapidly consolidating their gains towards a parallel state.
The Sinhala Nation faces formidable challenges in negotiating a permanent solution with the Liberation Tigers while being haunted by “sovereignty fears,” as Tigers continue strengthen their parallel state structures in the NorthEast.
Sri Lanka Gullibility!
When Ranil talks about having peace talks with the LTTE;
He is offering the nation to the terrorists.
When Mahinda talks about having peace talks with the LTTE;
He is trying to find a practical solution through honorable peace!
When Ranil’s uncle was an Anglican Bishop;
He is a part of the Catholic mafia;
When Mahinda’s better half is a Catholic and he sends all his sons
To the leading Anglican school in the island,
It is his personal choice and he is still a Sinhalese Buddhist
Patriotic!
When Ranil says he is willing to talk with Prabhakaran (with Norway);
He is a traitor and giving country to the terrorists.
When Mahinda says he is willing to talk with Prabhakaran (without
Norway);
He is a Sinhalese Buddhist patriot and trying to find a practical
Solution!
When Ranil tells he gives fertilizer for Rs. 550 a kilo;
It is nothing but a `chanda gundu’ to get votes for the UNP.
When Mahinda tells he gives fertilizer for Rs. 350 a kilo;
He is genuine has the welfare of the farmers in his mind!
When Sri Lankan Army fights the LTTE terrorism;
They are doing a patriotic act and should be commended.
When Sri Lankan Army fights the JVP terrorism (in 1989);
There are torturing innocent youth in the torture camps like
Batalanda!
When Major General Janaka Perera fights with LTTE terrorism;
He is a Sinhalese Buddhist patriot,
When Major General Janaka Perera fights with JVP terrorism (in 1989);
He is a bloody traitor who killed innocent youths in Kurunegala.
When Vasudeva Nanayakkara is talking about a Federal solution;
He is a traitor of the worst kind.
When Vasudeva Nanayakkara is talking about a Federal solution (but
Supports Mahinda);
He is a Sinhalese Buddhist patriot.
When Vimukthi Jayasundera ridicules armed forces in his movies;
He is a traitor of the worst kind and should be hung.
When Somawansa Amarasinghe ridicules armed forces in his speeches;
He is a Sinhalese Buddhist patriot and should be embraced!
When LTTE attacks the Katunayake Airport;
It is an act of worst kind terrorism.
When JVP attacks the Katunayake Airport,
It is a show of patriotism against anti-Sinhalese Buddhist enemies.
When LTTE attacks Dalada Maligawa;
It is an act of terrorism and everyone remembers it.
When JVP attacks Dalada Maligawa;
Well, nobody seems even to remember!
Surely, the JVP might be thinking that all Sri Lankans are `konde
bendapu Chinese’ who have born yesterday!